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Abstract
Economic Costs of the U.S. Wheat Export Enhancement Program:
Manna from Heaven or from Taxpayers?
Traditional models of export bonus programs focus only on the effects of disposing public
stocks on the world market.  We show that the economic effects of export bonus
programs are significantly different when one includes the costs of acquiring these stocks.
Including stock acquisition costs has the domestic price always rising, rather than an
ambiguous effect of the traditional model of an export bonus program.  We also show that
including stock acquisition costs results in an export bonus scheme to be equivalent to
cash export subsidies.  When an export bonus program is combined with an existing target
price scheme, government cost may either rise or fall in either model, but for different
reasons.  In an empirical simulation of the U.S. Export Enhancement Program for wheat,
we show that the model that includes acquisition costs induces a lower level of tax cost
than the traditional model even though taxpayers bear the additional burden of acquisition
expenditures.
JEL classification: Q17 Agriculture in International Trade
Keywords:  agricultural trade, Export Enhancement Program, export subsidies, in-kindEconomic Costs of the U.S. Wheat Export Enhancement Program:
Manna from Heaven or from Taxpayers?
1.  Introduction
In 1985, the United States established the Export Enhancement Program (EEP) whereby
government owned commodities were donated to exporters as a bonus with commercial exports.1
Several theoretical analyses of this policy that reduces public stocks have shown it to have
ambiguous effects on domestic market prices, commercial sales and export earnings (Houck;
Paarlberg 1995, 1996; Anania, Bohman and Carter; and Chambers and Paarlberg), while empirical
studies have generated conflicting results (Anania, Bohman and Carter; and Brooks, Devadoss
and Meyers).  All previous studies that analyze the effects of an in-kind export bonus program
ignore the costs of acquiring the surplus stocks, and simply focus on the market and taxpayer
cost impacts of disposing public stocks.
Studies that treat stocks as manna from heaven are consistent with the “dubious”
accounting practices of the Office and Management and Budget, whereby the cost of stocks given
away as bonuses is “contrived” as sunk and the only taxpayer impact of the program is the cost if
its administration (Paarlberg, 1990).  Such an approach is based on the logic that the cost of
already acquired government stocks should not be considered as part of the market effects of their
disposal.  There are important economic reasons why such an approach may not be appropriate.
Export bonuses from government inventory for wheat over the entire time period was on the
order of 40 times the change in government inventories over that same period.  This means that
                        
1 Since its inception, EEP has donated over $3 billion of surplus Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) commodities into
export channels, subsidizing approximately 40 percent of U.S. wheat exports from 1985 to 1991 (Anania, Bohman and Carter).2
costs of the bonuses were replaced by government stock purchases.  Indeed, government
inventories even increased in some marketing years when EEP was in effect.2
We adopt a partial equilibrium framework to show how the economic effects of export
bonus programs are significantly different if one includes the acquisition costs of the public stocks.
Toward this end, we organize our paper as follows: section 2 compares the standard theoretical
results in the literature of an export bonus program, focussing only on the effects of disposing of
public stocks, to a model which also includes the costs of acquiring these stocks.  If only disposals
are considered, an export bonus program may increase or decrease domestic price, but if
acquisition cost is taken into account, the domestic price always rises.  In both models, the world
price always falls, and total exports always increase.  We also prove that if one includes
acquisition costs, an export bonus scheme is equivalent to an appropriately defined cash export
subsidy.
In section 3, following the analysis of Anania, Bohman and Carter, we incorporate the
specifics of the U.S. deficiency payment program with and without export bonus constraints.
Given an existing deficiency payment program, the traditional model (that ignores acquisition
costs) predicts that an export bonus scheme can either increase or decrease taxpayer costs,
depending on whether the domestic market price falls or rises.  When acquisition costs are
considered, the effect of the export bonus program on government cost is also ambiguous, but for
different reasons.  Deficiency payments always decline because the domestic price always rises,
but taxpayers must bear the additional burden of purchasing the stocks that are given away as
bonuses.  The net effect on government cost depends on whether the savings in deficiency
                        
2 Even if purchases and sales do not occur in the exact same time period, inter-temporally linked markets makes our analysis
most relevant.3
 payments outweigh the cost of stock acquisition.  This impact depends on market parameters and
is an empirical question.  We simulate the effects of the wheat export bonus program to illustrate
the significance of including acquisition costs, using data and parameters from a stylized version
of Anania, Bohman and Carter’s empirical model.  Even though acquisition expenditures are an
additional component in taxpayer cost in our proposed model, government costs are always lower
than in the traditional model.
2. The Theoretical Effects of an Export Bonus Program with and without Acquisition Costs
Consider a competitive industry which has the supply function Q(P) and sells its output to
both domestic and foreign buyers.  Denote the domestic demand function by DD(P), and
importers’ (excess) demand function by DF(P).  Throughout, we assume that Q¢(P) > 0, DD¢(P) <
0 and DF¢(P) < 0, and abstract from any transportation costs.  In Figure 1, the curve labeled ES is
the industry’s excess supply function Q(P) – DD(P), and ED represents excess demand by
importers.  Free trade equilibrium occurs where excess supply and excess demand are equal; it is
the pair (Q*, P*), such that Q* = Q(P*) – DD(P*) = DF(P*).  Below, we explore the departures
from this equilibrium which result from three distinct policy experiments:  (1) an export bonus
program such as the one discussed by Houck, whereby previously accumulated government
stocks are awarded as export bonuses: (2) an export bonus program which must be sustained by
government purchases of the product in the current period; and (3) a cash export subsidy
program.  We go on to prove that (2) and (3) are exactly equivalent policies for a given amount of
exports, in that their affects on domestic price, world price, and government cost are identical.
Previous analyses of export bonus programs (Houck; Anania, Bohman, and Carter) model
only the disposition of government stocks as bonuses, and ignore the process by which stocks
were acquired.  In such models, the government donates R(QC, P) units from (already acquired)4
government stocks to exporting firms who arrange to sell QC units of product through commercial
channels at a price of P, where R(×) is any positive-valued, nondecreasing function3.  Thus, the
post-policy excess supply function becomes Q(P) – DD(P) + R(×), and lies to the right of the
original excess supply, as shown by the curve ES¢ in Figure 1.
We assume perfect competition among exporting firms.  The function of these firms is to
obtain wheat in the domestic market and then sell it to foreign buyers.  Given the assumption of
competition, each exporting firm earns a profit of zero.  When these intermediaries arrange to
export QC + R(QC, P) units under the bonus program, they purchase buy QC units at the domestic
price P and receive R(×) units for free from government stocks.  Their average cost of obtaining
wheat to export is thus aP, where a º QC/(QC + R(×)) is the proportion of commercial product in
total exports. The zero profit condition implies that PW = aP, where PW is the world price.
Consequently, the “effective” excess demand function for product exported under the bonus
program is DF(aP), or the original excess demand evaluated at the average price of exported
product aP.  Geometrically, this post-policy demand schedule is a vertical expansion of the
original excess demand, as illustrated by the curve ED¢ in Figure 1.
In equilibrium, total demand equals total supply, and imports equal the sum of commercial
exports and bonuses.  Formally,
(1)  DD(P) + DF(aP) = Q(P) + R(QC, P)
(2)  DF(aP) = QC + R(QC, P)
                        
3 In general, the amount of bonuses may depend on both commercial exports and the export price.  In a proportional bonus
program, which is the type depicted in Figure 1, bonuses are a fixed percentage of commercial exports; R is thus independent
of P and takes the form R = rQC.  If, as in the U.S. EEP, bonuses are awarded in dollar-denominated certificates which can be
exchanged for an equivalent value of the commodity, R = QCB/P, where B is the dollar value of the certificates awarded per
unit of QC.5
A rearrangement of (1) implies that the post-policy equilibrium (Q¢, P¢) occurs at the intersection
of the post-policy excess demand and supply curves, shown in Figure 1 as point c.  Combining (1)
and (2) reveals that commercial exports, QC, equals the pre-policy excess demand, Q(P¢) –
DD(P¢).  Thus, commercial exports can represented by the distance ab, bonuses are equal to bc,
and a is the ratio ab/ac.  In general, the new equilibrium price (P¢), commercial exports (aQ¢),
and the value of commercial exports (aP¢Q¢) may be larger, smaller, or equal to their values under
free trade, depending on the elasticity of excess demand.  However, the new equilibrium world
price is (aP¢) is always smaller than P*, and the total quantity traded, including bonuses, (Q¢) is
always larger than Q* (Houck).
By not accounting for stock acquisition, the model ignores the fact that the initial
acquisition of the stocks involves taxpayer costs and affects the market.  In order to incorporate
these effects, we now explicitly include the acquisition process in the model, requiring that an
equal amount of stocks are acquired and released as bonuses each period.4  That is, stocks given
away in the current period must be replaced by an equal amount of new government purchases.
As above, the government gives R(QC, P) units as bonuses for each QC units sold
commercially.  From importers’ perspective, this bonus schedule is the only information of
relevance, and the post-policy demand schedule takes the same form, DF(aP).  Within the
domestic market, supply and demand relationships are as before, but the government is now an
additional buyer.  Let G(P) be government purchases of the product.  In Figure 2(a), domestic
supply and demand are shown by the curves D and S, respectively, and the sum of government
                        
4 Even if the amount going into stocks does not equal EEP disbursements each year, one still has recognize that storable
commodities have an intertemporal equilibrium such that the current market price reflects the anticipated effects of the stock
change.6
and domestic market demand is D¢.  Thus, at the price P¢, domestic consumption is the distance
ab, government purchases are bc, and cd units are available for commercial export.
Compared to the model above, the market equilibrium conditions are changed to
accommodate the additional demand by the government and the fact that bonuses must be
balanced by government purchases:
(3)  DD(P) + DF(aP) + G(P) = Q(P) + R(QC)
(4)  DF(aP) = QC + R(QC)
(5)  G(P) = R(QC)
Substituting (5) into (3), the equilibrium quantity traded Q¢ and domestic price P¢ must satisfy:
(6) Q¢ = DF(aP¢) = Q(P¢) – DD(P¢);
i.e., post-policy excess demand equals excess supply.  The new equilibrium is shown in Figure
2(b) at the intersection of ED¢ and ES, or at point g.  ES does not shift in this model because the
government acquires the same quantity as it releases as bonuses.  The dashed line above ES
represents the quantity of commercial exports; it is the horizontal distance between S and D¢ in
Figure 2(a).  In equilibrium, the quantity of commercial exports is thus ef (equal to the distance cd
in Figure 2(a)), and bonuses are fg (which equals government purchases, bc).  Because the
government acquires R(QC, P¢) units at a cost of P¢ per unit and releases the same quantity as free
bonuses, the cost of the program is R(QC, P¢)P¢ = (1 - a)Q¢P¢, or the area fgih.  The new world
price is aP¢.  In this model, the domestic price always increases if an export bonus program is
initiated (P¢ > P*), and the world price always falls (aP¢ < P*).  This result contrasts the
traditional literature, where the change in domestic price is ambiguous.7
As a third policy option, we consider a cash export subsidy program.  To make an
appropriate comparison, we need to consider the subsidy required to achieve the same amount of
total exports as the bonus program (namely, Q¢ units in Figure 2(b)).  Geometrically, this subsidy
is the vertical distance between ES and ED at Q¢, represented by the segment gj in Figure 2(b).  It
is the value S (with corresponding price P) such that DF(P - S) = Q(P) – DD(P) = Q¢, where
import demand and excess supply are both equal to Q¢, given that the price to importers is
reduced by S per unit.  Because P¢ is the unique price where Q(P) – DD(P) = Q¢ (Figure 2(b)), this
condition reduces to DF(P¢ – S) = Q¢.  By equation (6), the unique value of the appropriate
subsidy is S = (1 - a)P¢.
The cost of such an export subsidy program is the subsidy rate times exports, or
(1 - a)P¢Q¢, which is exactly equal to the cost of the export bonus program.  This means that the
areas fgih and egjk in Figure 2(b) are equal.  In general, therefore, any export bonus program can
be modeled as an export subsidy, where the subsidy rate is defined as the difference between
equilibrium domestic and world prices with the bonus program in place.
An Analytical Example
Consider the case of constant elasticity excess supply and demand curves of the form Q(P)
= AP
a, and D(P) = BP












B A * Q + + = ,









Suppose the government then implements an export bonus program where bonuses are
proportional to commercial exports: R(QC, P) = rQC.  In such a program, the proportion of
commercial product in total exports is the constant fraction a =  r 1
1
+ .  In the traditional model of
no acquisition costs, the post-policy excess supply and excess demand functions are, respectively:
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Thus, an export bonus program may cause the domestic price to remain unchanged, fall, or rise,
depending on the elasticity of excess demand:
P¢ = P*  if  b = 1
P¢ < P*  if  b < 1
P¢ > P*  if  b > 1
The equilibrium world price is given by









Total exports (including bonuses) are:
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Again, the level of commercial exports depends on the elasticity of excess demand:9
QC = Q*  if  b = 1
QC < Q*  if  b < 1
QC > Q*  if  b > 1
Post-policy export earnings are  b a
) 1 b )( 1 a (
C ) r 1 ( * P * Q P Q +
- +
+ = ¢ , which is equal to, greater than, or
less than Q*P* (free trade export earnings) if b is equal to, greater than, or less than unity,
respectively.  Because acquisition costs of bonuses are not considered, the additional taxpayer
cost of the traditional program is zero.
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The equilibrium domestic price in this model is:
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Note also that P¢¢> P¢.  Equilibrium world price is:
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Commercial exports are:












Export earnings in this model are  b a
) 1 b ( a
C ) r 1 ( * P * Q P Q +
-
+ = ¢ ¢ , which depends on b in the same
manner as above.  Taxpayers must bear the cost of the bonuses, equal to
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which reduces to  b a
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+ .  Thus, taxpayer cost is always r times export earnings.
If the government had chosen a cash export subsidy program to accomplish its export goal
of Q¢¢ units, it would need to offer a cash subsidy equal to the difference between the equilibrium













This is an ad valorem export subsidy, with subsidy rate r/(1+r); for any domestic price P,
importers would receive a discount equal to  P r 1
r
+ , and their effective price would be  P r 1
1
+ .  Thus,
the post-policy excess supply and demand functions are identical to the export bonus program
with stock acquisition, and generate the same equilibrium (Q¢¢, P¢¢).  The taxpayer cost of the cash
export subsidy program is the subsidy rate times the value of exports, or  Q P r 1
r ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ + , which equals
b a
) 1 b ( a
) r 1 ( * P * rQ +
-
+ , or the costs of the export bonus program with stock acquisition.
Summarizing their effects in Table 1 reveals the differences in these two models.  When
including acquisition costs, producer (consumer) welfare always increases (decreases) because the
domestic market price unambiguously increases (unlike in the model ignoring acquisition costs),
taxpayer costs are now positive and the effect on the level of commercial exports is always
ambiguous.11
3.  Implications of Including Acquisition Costs: An Empirical Example
We use a stylized version of Anania, Bohman and Carter’s model to illustrate the
implications of including acquisition costs in the U.S. Export Enhancement Program (EEP) for
wheat.  As in their study, the data are based on U.S. wheat sales in calendar year 1988.  In the
U.S. program, EEP sales to each targeted market could not exceed a specified maximum, and
Anania, Bohman and Carter report that these constraints were binding in 1988 for all major
importers.  As in their analysis, we therefore include a volume constraint on eligible EEP wheat
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where Q  is the maximum volume of total exports (including bonuses) which can be sold under
the EEP.  For “small” amounts of total exports, the bonus constraint does not bind, and bonuses
are proportional to total exports.  Therefore, the dashed line above ES in Figure 3, representing
the division of exports between bonus and commercial wheat, is an upward rotation of ES for
total exports in the range [] Q , 0 .  Once the volume constraint is reached, bonuses are a fixed




 bushels to its left.
If importers buy some quantity of wheat for which constraint is not binding, the fraction of
commercial wheat in total exports is  r 1
r
+ = a , and the post-policy excess demand function is
therefore  ) P ( D r 1
1
F + .  This relationship is shown in Figure 3, where the locus ED¢ is a proportional
vertical increase of the original excess demand ED for total exports in the appropriate range.  If
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shown that the demand function DF(aP) in this range is bounded by the functions DF(P) and
) P ( D r 1
1
F + .  Further, if DF(P) is linear (as in Figure 3), then DF(aP) is strictly convex to the origin.
Accordingly, ED¢ in this range is shown as a strictly convex locus lying between the original ED
and its upward rotation  ) P ( D r 1
1
F + .
The equilibrium quantity traded and price of commercial exports are determined by the
intersection of ES and ED¢.  Consistent with the general results above, total exports Q¢ and the
price of commercial exports P¢ are unambiguously larger than their values under free trade, (Q*,
P*).  The equilibrium corresponds to a binding volume constraint; the distance eb in Figure 3 is
the bonuses awarded for the maximum eligible sales Q .  The equilibrium value of a is thus the
ratio ae/ab, and the world price is aP’.  Invoking the equivalence of an export bonus and an
export subsidy, the program is equivalent to a cash subsidy equal to the segment bc, and
government cost is the area abcd.
In the U.S. wheat program, producers do not receive the market price of commercial
exports, but rather are guaranteed a target price through deficiency payments.  Figure 4 shows the
situation when an export bonus program is combined with a deficiency payment program.  The
left panel depicts domestic supply (S), demand (D), and target price (T).  Because farmers receive
a guaranteed minimum target price, the effective supply is perfectly inelastic at QT for all prices
below T.  This policy intervention in the domestic market creates a “kink” in the excess supply
curve; ES is constructed as the distance between QT and DD(P) if P < T, and the distance Q(P) –
DD(P) if P ³ T.  Because the domestic deficiency payment program does not change foreign
demand, the ED curve is not affected.  The equilibrium without an export bonus or subsidy occurs
at the intersection of the kinked ES and ED, where Q* bushels are traded on the world market13
and the world price is P*.  The cost of the deficiency payment program to the U.S. government is
QT(T – P*), or the area a + b + c + d + e + f + g.
If the government introduces a constrained export subsidy, in addition to the deficiency
payment program, the excess demand and supply curves change as described above.  The bonus
function is once again of the constrained form in (7); the “division line” between commercial and
bonus exports is an upward rotation of ES until the volume constraint holds, and for all greater
quantities lies parallel to ES.  The new excess demand curve ED’ is exactly the same as in Figure
3.  The equilibrium quantity traded under the combined policies is Q¢, the price of U.S. exports
rises to P¢, and world price falls to aP¢.  By the equivalence proposition, the export bonus
program is equivalent to a cash subsidy of (P¢ - aP¢) dollars, and the cost of the export bonus is
the rectangular area e + f + g + h + i + j.  Total government costs are made up of this bonus
cost, plus deficiency payments of area a + b + c.  The change in total government cost, as a result
of initiating an export bonus program, is therefore the area (h + i + j) minus area d.
Anania, Bohman and Carter argue that a constrained export bonus program always lowers
domestic price and therefore increases government expenditures through larger deficiency
payments.  If the acquisition of stocks is taken into account, this result does not hold.  The export
bonus program will increase government expenditures if the area h + i + j is larger than area d, or
if the impact of export subsidies on the world market price offsets the savings in deficiency
payments.  Whether expenditures rise or fall depends on market elasticities.  In the limiting case of
a completely elastic excess demand curve (the “small country” case), the price aP¢ would equal
P*, and the area h + i + j would disappear.  Provided the new domestic equilibrium price is
smaller than the target price, government expenditures would unequivocally fall in such a case.14
Empirical Simulation
To illustrate the consequences of not incorporating acquisition costs, we compare the
outcome of the model described in Figure 4 with that of ignoring acquisition costs.  Although we
use all of the data and parameters of Anania, Bohman and Carter’s wheat example, we do not
replicate their empirical model.  Instead, the model we calibrate in Figure 4 differs from that of
Anania, Bohman and Carter by more than just including acquisition costs.  In their study, the
wedge between domestic and world prices before the volume constraint is binding is depicted as
the value of commodities awarded per unit of commercial exports.  This wedge is inappropriate
for the case when bonuses are in the form of commodities.5  After the export constraint is
reached, Anania, Bohman and Carter depict the bonus inclusive excess demand curve to be the
original linear excess demand curve ED in Figure 4 (not the non-linear segment) and so ignore the
wedge between domestic and world prices.  The data and parameters used for calibration of our
model, as well as the calibrated equations, are reported in the Appendix.
The impact of including acquisition costs (with deficiency payments and a volume
constraint) is summarized in Table 2.  Domestic market prices always increase with acquisition
costs (less likely when ignoring acquisition costs at lower levels of excess demand only) and the
more so relative to the traditional model ignoring acquisition costs at lower excess demand
elasticities.  World prices always fall as in the traditional model but always less so (and the gap
decreases with the elasticity of excess demand).  Total exports always go up but less so than the
traditional model ignoring acquisition cost because acquisition costs have to come out of current
                        
5 To see this, suppose that the domestic price is P and that bonuses come in the form of a certificate worth $B of commodity for
each unit of commercial exports sold.  In Anania, Bohman and Carter’s model, the post-policy excess supply curve lies
everywhere below the original excess supply by a distance of B; domestic and world prices always differ by $B.  However, in
equilibrium, the world price is must equal the average price paid by an importer buying QC + QCB/P, which is P
2/(P+B).  Thus,
the difference between world and domestic prices (the “shift” in ES) is PB/(P+B) ¹ B.15
production.   Commercial exports always goes down in our model where it is ambiguous in the
traditional model.  As for taxpayer costs, deficiency payments always go down in our model
because domestic price always increases.  Net tax costs can theoretically increase or decrease,
however, because acquisition costs are always positive.  The net effect depends on the elasticity of
excess demand and the share of production exported.  Even though acquisition costs are included,
Table 2 shows how total tax costs decline in our empirical model but can either increase or
decrease in the traditional model (and be more or less so than in our model).  Note that deficiency
payments are the reason for tax costs to decline when including acquisition costs because the
results in Table 1 clearly indicate that tax costs increase when including acquisition costs in the
basic model of an export bonus program with no other government policy instruments in place.
Concluding remarks
Traditional analyses of EEP have ambiguous effects on domestic market prices,
commercial sales and export earnings.  But all previous studies ignore the costs of acquiring the
surplus stocks, and focus only on the market and taxpayer cost impacts of disposing public
stocks.  Studies that treat stocks as manna from heaven assume the cost of existing government
stocks should not be considered as part of the market effects of their disposal.  However, export
bonuses from government inventory for wheat over the entire time period was in the order of 40
times the change in government inventories over that same period.  This means that most of the
bonuses were replaced by government stock purchases.
Using a partial equilibrium framework, we show that the economic effects of export bonus
programs are significantly different if one includes the acquisition costs of the public stocks.  If
only disposals are considered, an export bonus program may generate an increase or decrease in
domestic prices, but if acquisition cost is taken into account, the domestic price always rises.  In16
both models, the world price always falls, and total exports always increase.  When including
acquisition costs, producer (consumer) welfare always increases (decreases) because the domestic
market price increases, taxpayer costs are now positive and the effect on the level of commercial
exports is always ambiguous.  Following the analysis of Anania, Bohman and Carter, we
incorporate the specifics of the U.S. deficiency payment program, with and without export bonus
constraints.  Given an existing deficiency payment program, the traditional model ignoring
acquisition costs predicts that an export bonus scheme can either increase or decrease taxpayer
cost, depending on whether the domestic market price falls or rises.  When acquisition cost is
considered, the effect of the export bonus program on government cost is also ambiguous, but for
different reasons.  Deficiency payments always decline because the domestic price always rises,
but taxpayers must bear the additional burden of purchasing the stocks that are given away as
bonuses.  The net effect on government cost depends on whether the savings in deficiency
payments outweigh the cost of stock acquisition.  This impact depends on market parameters and
is an empirical question.
Anania, Bohman and Carter argue that a constrained export bonus program always lowers
domestic price and therefore increases government expenditures through larger deficiency
payments while our model has deficiency payments always going down because the domestic
price increases.  The export bonus program will increase net government expenditures if the
impact of export subsidies on the world market price offsets the savings in deficiency payments in
our model (the outcome depends on market elasticities).  In theory, net change in tax costs can go
up or down, depending on the elasticity of excess demand and the share of production exported.
Even though acquisition costs are included, total tax costs decline in our empirical model but can
either increase or decrease in the traditional model (and be more or less so than in our model).17
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Appendix:  Model Calibration
Table A1.  Base Data and Parameters for Calibration
a
Item Value Source
Domestic Production (mmt) 65.1 Anania, Bohman and Carter, Table 3
Domestic Consumption (mmt) 26.5 Anania, Bohman and Carter, Table 3
Total Exports (mmt) 38.6 Domestic Prod. – Domestic Cons.
EEP Sales (mmt) 25.74 Anania, Bohman and Carter, Table 2
   (total EEP sales over all importers)
Bonus Rate ($/mt) 28.95 Anania, Bohman and Carter, Table 2
   (weighted average subsidy across
importers)
Bonuses (mmt) 5.44 EEP Sales ´ Bonus Rate / Domestic Price
Commercial Exports (mmt) 33.16 Total Exports – Bonuses
Domestic Price ($/mt) 137.00 Anania, Bohman and Carter, Table 2
World Price ($/mt) 117.70 Domestic Price ´ Comm. Exp. / Total Exp.
Target Price ($/mt) 155.00 Anania, Bohman and Carter, Table 2
Elasticity of Domestic Demand 0.3
Elasticity of Excess Supply 0.206 Elasticity of Domestic Dem. ´ Domestic
Cons. / Total Exports
a U.S. data for wheat, 1988 crop year
Table A2.  Calibrated Excess Demand and Excess Supply Equations
Excess Demand Elasticity
-0.5 -1.0 -3.0 -5.0
Excess Demand Equation
     Intercept 57.90 77.20 154.40 231.60
     Slope -0.16 -0.33 -0.98 -1.64
Excess Supply Equation
     Intercept 30.65 30.65 30.65 30.65
     Slope 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06Table 1.  Effects of a proportional export bonus program
a
Without acquisition cost With acquisition cost
Unitary Inelastic Elastic Unitary Inelastic Elastic
Domestic price 0 - + + + +
World price - - - - - -
Total exports + + + + + +
Commercial exports 0 - + ? ? ?
Export earnings 0 - + 0 - +
Stock acquisition cost 0 0 0 + + +
a A proportional export bonus program means that R(QC, P) = rQC for some r > 0.
Legend:   0  no change compared to free trade
                -  less than under free trade
               +  more than under free trade
               ?  ambiguousTable 2.  Effects of the U.S. Wheat Export Bonus Program in 1988 with a Volume Constraint and Deficiency Payments
Excess Demand Elasticity


















   Domestic Price ($/mt) -14.21 14.26 -1.27 16.40 9.96 18.23 12.54 18.64
   World Price ($/mt) -28.14 -5.05 -16.36 -2.90 -6.12 -1.08 -3.76 -0.66
   Total Exports (mmt) 4.61 0.83 5.37 0.95 6.02 1.06 6.17 1.08
   Commercial Exports (mmt) -0.82 -4.61 -0.07 -4.49 0.58 -4.38 0.73 -4.36
   Taxpayer Costs (mil. $)
         deficiency payments 925.19 -928.18 82.70 -1067.73 -648.27 -1186.66 -816.09 -1213.70
         stock acquisition 0.0 745.11 0.00 745.11 0.00 745.11 0.00 745.11
         total 925.19 -183.08 82.70 -322.62 -648.27 -441.55 -816.09 -468.59
Source: calculatedFigure 1.  The Traditional Model of an Export Bonus Program
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